



GOVERNMENT MANDATED DRUG TESTING FOR WELFARE 
RECIPIENTS:  SPECIAL NEED OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
CONDITION? 
Celia Goetzl * 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, Congress passed major welfare reform legislation.  It 
signed into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), which replaced the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”) program and created 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (“TANF").1  TANF empha-
sizes moving recipients from “welfare to work”2 and specifically au-
thorizes states to drug test welfare recipients and to sanction those 
who test positive.3  In 1999, Michigan was the first state to implement 
a suspicionless drug testing policy as a condition for receiving welfare 
benefits.4  A district court struck down the policy on Fourth Amend-
ment grounds, and the Sixth Circuit court ultimately divided, up-
holding the district court’s injunction and putting a temporary stop 
to the policy.5  However, the constitutional issues remain undecided.6 
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 1 See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev’d, 309 F.3d 
330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003), 
aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 2 About TANF, OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/programs/tanf/about (last visited Mar. 20, 2013). 
 3 21 U.S.C. § 862b (2006) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be 
prohibited by the Federal Government from testing welfare recipients for use of con-
trolled substances nor from sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of 
controlled substances.”); Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(Scriven, J.) (“Congress authorizes states to test welfare recipients for controlled sub-
stances and to sanction those who test positive.”). 
 4 Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread:  Welfare, Drug Testing, and the Inferior Fourth 
Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 754 (2009). 
 5 Id. at 754–55 (citing Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1134).  However, Michigan again 
proposed similar legislation, relatively recently.  See Crystal Garcia, State Could Require Drug 
Test to Receive Welfare, TIMES HERALD (Port Huron, Mich.), Dec. 30, 2011, at A1. 
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Since 2007, members of Congress,7 well over half of the states, and 
some U.S. territories8 have proposed similar legislation requiring 
drug testing for welfare recipients as a condition of receiving public 
assistance.9  Recently, Florida enacted such a statute.10  Soon thereaf-
ter, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) brought a case 
challenging the law’s constitutionality under the Fourth Amend-
ment.11  A federal district court judge ordered the preliminary injunc-
tion necessary to suspend the policy, and the Eleventh Circuit af-
 
 6 Budd, supra note 4, at 754–55. 
 7 In 2009, Congress introduced federal legislation requiring drug testing for all recipients 
of federally funded public assistance.  Budd, supra note 4, at 775.  Federal legislation is 
still on the table.  See Adam Cohen, Drug Testing the Poor:  Bad Policy, Even Worse Law, TIME 
(Aug. 29, 2011), http://ideas.time.com/2011/08/29/drug-testing-the-poor-bad-policy-
even-worse-law/ (“Senator David Vitter, a Louisiana Republican, has introduced the Drug 
Free Families Act of 2011, which would require all 50 states to drug-test [sic] welfare ap-
plicants.”). 
 8 See Drug Tester, Guam Senator Pushes for Drug Testing of Welfare Recipients, 
CONFIRMBIOSCIENCES (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.confirmbiosciences.com/blog/welfare-
recipients-drug-testing/guam-senator-pushes-for-drug-testing-of-welfare-recipients.html 
(discussing proposed legislation in Guam). 
 9 See Budd, supra note 4, at 774 (“[D]rug testing legislation appeared in over half of the 
states by 2009.”); Associated Press, Growing Support for Drug Testing of Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 26, 2012, at A18 (“Nearly two dozen states are considering measures that would 
make drug testing mandatory for welfare recipients, according to the National Confer-
ence of State Legislatures.”); Jim Lynch & Karen Bouffard, Welfare Recipients May Face Drug 
Tests, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 29, 2011, at A1 (“Thirty-six states are considering testing laws 
that would require urine sample testing for public assistance.”); A.G. Sulzberger, States 
Adding Drug Test as Hurdle for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2011, at A1 (“This year, 36 states 
considered drug testing for recipients of case assistance from the major welfare program, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families . . . .”). 
 10 See FLA. STAT. § 414.0652 (2011); see also Michael C. Bender, Scott Signs Bill Forcing Drug 
Testing on Welfare Recipients, MIAMI HERALD (May 31, 2011), http://miamiherald.
typepad.com/nakedpolitics/2011/05/scott-signs-bill-forcing-drug-tests-on-welfare-
recipients.html (“Floridians will have to submit urine, blood or hair samples for drug test-
ing before receiving cash benefits from the state under a bill Gov. Rick Scott signed into 
law . . . .”); Cohen, supra note 7 (“Under a new Florida law, people applying for welfare 
have to take a drug test at their own expense.”). 
 11 Sulzberger, supra note 9, at A1 (“The law . . . provoked a lawsuit . . . from the American 
Civil Liberties Union, arguing that the requirement represents an unreasonable search 
and seizure.”). 
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firmed the decision.12  But, the push for welfare recipient drug testing 
legislation continues, in Florida and elsewhere.13 
Such policies stereotype, stigmatize, and criminalize the poor 
without cause.14  Studies have shown that welfare recipients are no 
more likely than the general population to abuse drugs,15 and drug 
testing programs cost taxpayers significantly more than they save.16  
But, aside from bad policy, does drug testing in this context consti-
tute an unlawful search under current constitutional doctrine? 
Courts and commentators are applying a standard Fourth 
Amendment analysis to the emerging laws.  The Fourth Amendment 
generally prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures without par-
ticularized suspicion or warrants.17  Under some circumstances, how-
ever, the “special needs” doctrine gives the government greater lati-
tutde.  Even without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, a search 
may still be reasonable if the government can show that it is warrant-
 
 12 See Lebron v. Wilkins, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1281 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]here is a substan-
tial likelihood that [plaintiff’s] challenge to the constitutionality of [the Florida statute] 
under the Fourth Amendment will succeed.”), aff’d, Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Chil-
dren & Families, No. 11-15258, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998, at *44 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 
2013); Michael Mayo, Judge Makes Right Call in Halting Florida Welfare Drug Testing, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Oct. 27, 2011, at 1B (discussing Florida district court 
ruling). 
 13 Florida announced its intent to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court.  See Arthur 
Delaney, Florida Welfare Drug Testing Law Gets No Reprieve From Appeals Court, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 26, 2013, 2:38PM, updated 3:06PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/02/26/florida-welfare-drug-testing_n_2766479.html.  Georgia passed its own legis-
lation on April 16, 2012.  See 2012 Georgia Laws Act 583 (H.B. 861); Evan Beauchamp & 
Andrew Hazen, Social Services, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 224, 232 (2012) (legislative review); 
Kristin Torres, Deal OKs Welfare Drug Tests; Lawsuit Likely, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Apr. 16, 
2012), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/deal-oks-welfare-drug-
tests-lawsuit-likely/nQS5c. 
 14 See generally Kaaryn Gustafson, Criminal Law:  The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 643 (2009); see also Budd, supra note 4, at 754; Michele Estrin Gilman, The 
Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1416, 1445 (2012) (noting that 
“[t]he stigma of drug testing is a way to discourage the needy from seeking assistance” 
and that this kind of data collection “stigmatize[s] and humiliate[s], . . . compounding 
the harmful effects of living in poverty”). 
 15 See Budd, supra note 4, at 776–77 (noting “the correlation between poverty and drug ad-
diction is quite weak” and citing various studies finding drug abuse among welfare recipi-
ents to be at or below the national level). 
 16 See Walker Newell, Tax Dollars Earmarked for Drugs? The Policy And Constitutionality of Drug 
Testing Welfare Recipients, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 215, 250–51 (2011); Rachel Bloom, 
Drug-Testing Welfare Recipients:  A Trend With No Traction, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2012, 
2:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachel-bloom/drug-testing-welfare_b_ 
1317162.html (explaining Virginia’s decision not to pass legislation because it would cost 
$1.3 million and save only $229,165 in the first year). 
 17 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997) (“To be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, a search ordinarily must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdo-
ing.”). 
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ed by a “special need[], beyond the normal need for law enforce-
ment.”18  The special needs analysis consists of a balancing test weigh-
ing individual privacy interests against government interests.19  Most 
analyses of welfare recipient drug testing employ the special needs 
doctrine and conclude that individual interests outweigh those of the 
government, making the search unconstitutional.20 
However, reliance on the special needs doctrine alone overlooks 
the element of consent in these cases.  Laws mandating drug testing 
for welfare recipients do not involve government searches of unwill-
ing individuals, the standard Fourth Amendment situation.  They in-
stead force individuals to consent to invasive drug tests and thereby 
relinquish Fourth Amendment rights.  Technically, an individual 
does not have to consent, and if she does not consent, no search 
takes place.21  Thus, the drug tests are, at least in a formal sense, con-
sensual searches.  And, consent generally eliminates any potential 
Fourth Amendment problem with a search.22 
The Court has dealt with the problem of consent as a waiver of 
constitutional rights with an “unconstitutional conditions” analysis.  
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which originated in the 
context of First Amendment government employee speech rights, 
purports to “prevent[] the government from penalizing those who 
exercise their constitutional rights by withholding a benefit that oth-
erwise would be available.”23  This would seem to apply to an individ-
ual deprived of welfare benefits for asserting a Fourth Amendment 
right.  So, under current doctrine, mandated drug testing for welfare 
recipients should be analyzed as an unconstitutional condition, not as 
an ordinary Fourth Amendment search.  Unfortunately, the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine is incoherent, and examining it is “diso-
rienting.”24  Though it generally announces that the government 
cannot condition a benefit on the waiver of a constitutionally pro-
 
 18 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)). 
 19 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“When faced with such special needs, we have not hesitated to 
balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant 
and probable-cause requirements in the particular context.”). 
 20 See infra notes 25 and 26 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, No. 11-15259, 2013 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 3998, at *32 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013) (“[U]nder Florida’s program, an applicant 
is required to sign an acknowledgement that he or she consents to drug testing.  Accord-
ingly . . . the drug test is administered only to those persons who have consented to the 
test . . . .”). 
 22 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1972). 
 23 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 980 (3d ed. 2006). 
 24 Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions:  The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1984). 
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tected right, cases do not identify or distinguish prohibited from ac-
ceptable conditions.  Thus, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
ultimately fails to provide a solution. 
This Comment argues for a new constitutional analysis to address 
emerging welfare recipient drug testing cases under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Part I explains why a standard Fourth Amendment 
special needs analysis does not directly apply.  Part II considers the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine and explains why its use is ulti-
mately futile.  Part III discusses First Amendment government em-
ployee speech cases as an example of a context in which the Court 
has developed a new doctrine to address similar issues.  It argues that 
the Court should similarly develop a test for Fourth Amendment vio-
lations in the context of conditioned welfare benefits.  The test 
should consider (1) whether the policy constitutes a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, (2) how easy it is for individuals 
to withhold consent, and (3) whether the search is substantially relat-
ed to the effective administration of the government services, or 
whether the government is merely leveraging power.  This Comment 
concludes that, under this substance-oriented analysis, legislation 
mandating drug testing for welfare recipients violates the Fourth 
Amendment. 
I.  THE STANDARD FOURTH AMENDMENT “SPECIAL NEEDS” ANALYSIS:  
NOT DIRECTLY APPLICABLE 
Courts and commentators have been directly applying standard 
Fourth Amendment doctrine to welfare recipient drug testing cases.25  
They argue that mandated drug testing for welfare recipients consti-
tutes an unreasonable search because the government cannot 
 
 25 See, e.g., Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (M.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d, Lebron v. Sec’y, 
Dep’t of Children & Families, No. 11-15258, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998, at *44 (11th Cir. 
Feb. 26, 2013); Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 2000), 
rev’d, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 
(6th Cir. 2003), aff’d by an equally divided court, 60 F. App’x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); 
Michael D. Socha, An Analysis of Michigan’s Plan for Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare Re-
cipients Under the Fourth Amendment “Special Needs” Exception, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1099 (2001); 
Lindsey Lyle, Note, Florida’s Legislation Mandating Suspicionless Drug Testing of TANF Benefi-
ciaries:  The Constitutionality and Efficacy of Implementing Drug Testing Requirements on the Wel-
fare Population, 8 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 68, 7984 (2012) (analyzing the constitutionality of 
Florida’s legislation with Fourth Amendment special needs case law); Abby E. Schaberg, 
Law Summary, State Drug Testing Requirements for Welfare Recipients:  Are Missouri and Flori-
da’s New Laws Constitutional?, 77 MO. L. REV. 567, 56971 (2012) (discussing application of 
Fourth Amendment special needs analysis to state drug testing requirements for welfare 
recipients). 
1544 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:5 
 
demonstrate a special need that justifies the privacy intrusion.26  For 
example, in Marchwinski v. Howard, the district court applied the 
Fourth Amendment special needs doctrine to find Michigan’s suspi-
cionless drug testing law unconstitutional.27  In so doing, however, it 
ignored the issue of consent, disregarding the State’s argument about 
“the voluntary nature of applying for welfare benefits.”28 
Yet many commend this court’s approach.  Professor Jordan C. 
Budd explains, “the district court in Marchwinski took the Constitu-
tion at its word and applied the Fourth Amendment on its conven-
tional terms to uphold the poor’s basic right to bodily autonomy.”29  
Budd argues that upcoming drug testing proposals offer a chance for 
federal courts to follow in the footsteps of the Marchwinski district 
court and redeem corrupted Fourth Amendment doctrine that has 
“denied indigent litigants the full force of otherwise applicable con-
stitutional guarantees.”30  While this is a laudable idea, it disregards 
the significance of consent and other distinguishing features in these 
cases that make it difficult, if not impossible, to view mandated drug 
tests for welfare recipients as standard Fourth Amendment searches. 
A.  Consent Is a Key Fourth Amendment Issue 
Though the Fourth Amendment generally prohibits government 
officials from performing searches without individualized suspicion,31 
an individual can waive this right.32  For example, if the police ask to 
 
 26 See Lebron, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1286 (“[T]he State has not demonstrated a substantial spe-
cial need to justify the wholesale, suspicionless drug testing of all applicants for TANF 
benefits.”); Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142 (“[T]he State’s financial assistance to 
parents for the care for their minor children . . . cannot be used to regulate the parents 
in a manner that erodes their privacy rights in order to further goals that are unrelated to 
the [welfare benefits].”); see generally Budd, supra note 4.  But cf. Jeffrey Widelitz, Florida’s 
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Welfare Applicants, 36 NOVA. L. REV. 253, 293–307 (2011) (find-
ing Florida law constitutional under a Fourth Amendment “special needs” analysis). 
 27 Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1135. 
 28 Id. at 1143.  The court compared the case to Chandler, arguing that the drug testing in 
Chandler “involved an even more voluntary activity” because “[n]o one is compelled to 
run for public office.”  Id.  The court misread Chandler because an individual has a consti-
tutional right to run for public office.  See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 29 Budd, supra note 4, at 804. 
 30 Id. at 803. 
 31 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997) (“[T]his restraint on government conduct 
generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspi-
cion.”). 
 32 See, e.g., Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998, at 
*32 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013) (“[A] search conducted pursuant to a valid consent is con-
stitutionally permissible.”) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 
(1973)). 
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look inside a random motorist’s trunk, and he says “yes,” there is no 
Fourth Amendment problem with the search.33  An individual’s con-
sent to a search removes the standard Fourth Amendment problem 
and eliminates the need for any further analysis.34  This principle is 
well established in the criminal context, and the Supreme Court has 
endorsed it in other situations as well. 
For example, in Wyman v. James,35 the Court assessed the constitu-
tionality of a New York policy requiring home visits by caseworkers as 
a condition of receiving public assistance.36  The Court held that the 
recipient’s ability to decline the visit (along with the aid) cured any 
Fourth Amendment problem, noting “the visitation in itself is not 
forced or compelled, and . . . the beneficiary’s denial of permission is 
not a criminal act.”37  It reasoned that “[i]f consent to the visitation is 
withheld, no visitation takes place.  The aid then never begins or 
merely ceases . . . . There is no entry of the home and there is no 
search.”38  The Court concluded that “[t]he choice is entirely [the in-
dividual’s], and nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved.”39 
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,40 the Court similarly addressed con-
sent in the context of government benefits.41  In this case, the Court 
assessed the constitutionality of a South Carolina policy endorsing 
the drug testing of hospitalized women receiving obstetrical care.42  
The hospital and law enforcement officials were collaborating to drug 
test women and using the results to prosecute them for child abuse.43  
The State argued that the women had consented to the drug tests.44  
However, the Fourth Circuit had not ruled on that issue.45  To apply 
the standard Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court expressly as-
sumed that the searches were conducted without informed consent.46  
But ultimately, the Court remanded the case for a decision on the 
 
 33 These are the facts of Schneckloth,  412 U.S. at 220. 
 34 Michelle Yoder, Drug Tests for Welfare:  Saving Taxpayer Money or Flushing it Down the Drain?, 
17 PUB. INT. L. REP. 56, 59 (2011) (“It is well established that a search, otherwise invalid, 
will be constitutional with the appropriate consent or waiver.”). 
 35 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
 36 Id. at 309. 
 37 Id. at 317. 
 38 Id. at 317–18. 
 39 Id. at 324. 
 40 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 41 Id. at 73–76. 
 42 Id. at 71–73. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 73. 
 45 Id. at 74. 
 46 Id. at 76. 
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consent issue.47  It reasoned that “when [hospitals] undertake to ob-
tain such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of in-
criminating those patients, they have a special obligation to make 
sure that the patients are fully informed about their constitutional 
rights, as standards of knowing waiver require.”48  Consent was the 
decisive factor.  The holding implied that, with informed consent, 
there would not have been a Fourth Amendment problem, and the 
drug tests would have been constitutional.49 
Wyman and Ferguson indicate that mandated drug testing policies 
for welfare recipients can avoid or survive direct Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny because of the recipients’ consent.  Like in Wyman, an indi-
vidual may choose not to consent to the drug test, and then, no drug 
test would take place.  As in Ferguson, an individual’s informed con-
sent would suggest that waiver is possible.  Thus, the consent involved 
removes any direct Fourth Amendment problem with welfare drug 
testing policies. 
B. Consent is Immaterial in Many Special Needs Cases for Other Reasons 
Though consent generally eliminates the Fourth Amendment 
problem, the Court has applied a standard Fourth Amendment anal-
ysis in some cases that do arguably feature consent.  However, these 
cases are all distinguishable from welfare drug testing cases on 
grounds that make consent immaterial. 
1.  Cases Involving Government Employees or Public Schoolchildren 
With government employees (who can choose not to work for the 
government) and schoolchildren (who can choose not to participate 
in extracurricular activities), the Court has not considered consent an 
important factor.  However, the Court did not focus on consent in 
these cases because the government won even under the nonconsen-
sual Fourth Amendment standard, making the question of consent 
irrelevant.50 
 
 47 Id.  On remand, the Fourth Circuit found the government had not obtained constitu-
tionally valid consent.  Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380, 404 (4th Cir. 2002). 
 48 Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 (emphasis omitted). 
 49 The problem is that a woman has little choice but to consent to such a search when 
threatened with the denial of medical care.  This is the same problem that affects welfare 
recipients when policies place drug testing conditions on the receipt of public assistance. 
 50 Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59–60 
(2006) (finding it unnecessary to consider the unconstitutional conditions doctrine be-
cause the government could simply impose the condition at issue without consent). 
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Both Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association51 and National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab52 involved government-mandated 
drug testing for government employees.  In Skinner, the Court held 
that federal regulations mandating drug tests for railroad employees 
were reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.53  It reasoned that 
“[e]mployees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught 
with . . . risks of injury to others that . . . can have disastrous conse-
quences.”54  Likewise, in Von Raab, the Court held that a program re-
quiring suspicionless drug testing for certain United States Customs 
Service employees was constitutional.55  It reasoned that these em-
ployees were the “first line of defense against [drug smuggling that 
affects] the health and welfare” of the country.56  It also reasoned that 
“successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their 
judgment and dexterity.”57  Thus, in both Skinner and Von Raab, the 
Court emphasized the importance of public safety.58  Because the 
government employees had duties related to public safety, their con-
sent, or lack thereof, did not matter. 
Similarly, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,59 the Court upheld 
a school district’s policy to drug test student athletes without individ-
ualized suspicion.60  It explained that “Fourth Amendment 
rights . . . are different in public schools than elsewhere.”61  The 
Court stressed schools’ “special responsibility of care and direction” 
for children, and reasoned that “the Policy was undertaken in fur-
therance of the government’s responsibilities . . . as guardian and tu-
tor of children entrusted to its care.”62  The Court went even further 
in Board of Education v. Earls,63 upholding a school district’s policy of 
drug testing all students who participated in any extracurricular activ-
ity.64  Relying on Vernonia, it “considered the constitutionality of the 
program in the context of the public school’s custodial responsibili-
 
 51 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 52 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
 53 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. 
 54 Id. at 628. 
 55 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677. 
 56 Id. at 668. 
 57 Id. at 672. 
 58 Id. at 677; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. 
 59 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 60 Id. at 650, 665. 
 61 Id. at 656. 
 62 Id. at 662, 665. 
 63 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 64 Id. at 826, 838. 
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ties.”65  Because of a public school’s role “in loco parentis,” a student’s 
consent or lack thereof was inconsequential.66 
Cases involving government mandated drug testing for welfare re-
cipients are different because, as most courts and commentators 
agree, in this context, a nonconsensual search without individualized 
suspicion is likely unconstitutional.67  And, welfare recipients should 
not be compared to government employees or schoolchildren.  Un-
like government employees, welfare recipients have no duty to the 
public, and the act of receiving public assistance does not make recip-
ients responsible for public safety in any way.  Relegating welfare re-
cipients to the same status as schoolchildren is oppressive and de-
meaning.  The government has no more responsibility to care for 
welfare recipients than it does to care for the general public.  Yet, it is 
beyond question that the government cannot randomly drug test the 
general public to patrol drug use.  Because drug testing welfare recip-
ients has nothing to do with ensuring public safety or parenting 
schoolchildren, the policy cannot survive a standard Fourth Amend-
ment special needs analysis regardless of any element of consent. 
2.  Policies Forcing Choice Between Constitutional Rights 
In the one civil search case that the government has lost,68 the 
Court also applied the Fourth Amendment special needs analysis di-
rectly, without considering consent.  In Chandler v. Miller, the Court 
struck down a Georgia statute requiring drug testing for candidates 
running for state offices.69  However, this case is distinguishable from 
other Fourth Amendment special needs cases because there is a con-
stitutional right to run for public office.70  Thus, with its drug testing 
policy, the state effectively asked citizens to choose between two con-
stitutional rights.  This invalidated any consent.71 
 
 65 Id. at 838. 
 66 See Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
 67 See supra note 26. 
 68 See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Special Needs and Special Deference:  Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Mod-
ern Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1223, 1229 (2004) (describing the Court’s recent 
suspicionless civil search cases). 
 69 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997). 
 70 See generally Anderson v. Calabrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 783, 806 (1983) (holding a state re-
striction on running for public office unduly burdened voters’ freedoms of choice and as-
sociation under the First Amendment). 
 71 The government cannot require citizens to surrender a constitutional right simply by of-
fering them the alternative of surrendering a different one.  Cf. New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992) (finding that Congress cannot offer states a choice of two 
alternatives, neither of which it could impose as a freestanding requirement). 
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Here again, mandated drug testing for welfare recipients is differ-
ent, for there is no constitutional right to welfare.72  Asking citizens to 
take a drug test or give up welfare does not require them to compro-
mise one constitutional right at the expense of another.  The Court’s 
use of a standard Fourth Amendment special needs analysis in Chan-
dler does not indiciate that such analysis is appropriate for welfare 
drug testing cases. 
II.  THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS DOCTRINE:  NOT A VIABLE 
SOLUTION 
The Supreme Court has dealt with the problem of conditional in-
fringements on constitutional rights before, using what is known as 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  The unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine stands for the proposition that “the government 
[cannot] condition a benefit on the requirement that a person fore-
go a constitutional right.”73  The Court has used this doctrine in sev-
eral different contexts, mostly involving First Amendment rights.  For 
example, the Court has held that the government cannot condition a 
tax exemption on the requirement that a person disavow his belief in 
overthrowing the federal government.74  It has also held that the gov-
ernment cannot condition unemployment benefits on a person’s will-
ingness to violate her religious principles.75  Thus, under current law, 
one would most naturally challenge a government policy condition-
ing the receipt of welfare benefits on a clean drug test under the un-
constitutional conditions doctrine.76 
 
 72 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484, 486–87 (1970) (noting that welfare is not a 
“freedom[] guaranteed by the Bill of Rights” in upholding a state policy limiting amounts 
of public assistance). 
 73 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 23, at 570.  There is a vast amount of scholarship on the uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine.  For the leading work on the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 
(1989). 
 74 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19, 528–29 (1958). 
 75 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1963). 
 76 Cf. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman:  Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 
72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931, 934–35 (1995) (“It is clear at the outset that contraceptive wel-
fare laws present an unconstitutional conditions problem.  They raise the classic uncon-
stitutional conditions question whether the government may condition the conferral of 
welfare benefits on the beneficiary’s surrender of her constitutional right to reproductive 
autonomy and bodily integrity, although the government might choose not to provide 
welfare benefits altogether.  The government is plainly doing indirectly what it could not 
do directly.”) 
   Many scholars discussed conditions on welfare in the context of unconstitutional 
conditions pre-Marchwinski.  See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Bargaining for Public Assistance, 72 
DENV. U. L. REV. 949, 950–51 (1995) (discussing author’s theory that the Court uses a 
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Accordingly, the district court in Lebron, the Florida case, looked 
to this doctrine to dispose of the issue  of consent.77  The court of-
fered a blanket assertion that “the State’s exaction of consent to an 
otherwise unconstitutional search in exchange for [welfare] benefits 
would violate the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.”78  The 
Eleventh Circuit court majority agreed.79  But, as Judge Jordan’s con-
currence hinted, this claim is much too broad.80  Unfortunately, case 
law does not consistently distinguish between those conditions that 
are prohibited and those that are reasonable. 
In theory, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine should pro-
vide a test to determine when the government can place conditions 
on the benefits it grants and require people to agree to something it 
could not otherwise require.  However, the doctrine is a conceptual 
failure, so it is not actually helpful.  Commentators have been unable 
to reconcile the many cases that invoke the doctrine or to develop a 
cohesive framework for understanding it.81 
In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the 
Supreme Court itself suggested that the doctrine is invoked or ig-
 
two-pronged test to decide unconstitutional conditions cases involving welfare benefits); 
Philippa M. Guthrie, Drug Testing and Welfare:  Taking the Drug War to Unconstitutional Lim-
its?, 66 IND. L.J. 579, 592, 598–602 (1991) (discussing three types of claims available to 
welfare recipients challenging a drug testing program, including an unconstitutional 
conditions claim). 
 77 Lebron v. Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1284 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Lebron v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 3998 at *40–43 
(11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2013). 
 80 Id. at *49–51 (Jordan, J., concurring). 
 81 See id. at *49 (Jordan, J., concurring) (“In my view the doctrine of unconstitutional condi-
tions is somewhat incoherent, and some of the cases decided under it are difficult to rec-
oncile.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 1013 (“[T]he cases cannot be reconciled . . . . If 
the Court wishes to strike down a condition, it declares it to be an unconstitutional condi-
tion; if the Court wishes to uphold a condition, it declares that the government is making 
a permissible choice to subsidize some activities and not others.”); see also RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 17–24 (1993) (discussing the lack of desirable large 
patterns in the unconstitutional conditions cases); Baker, supra note 72, at 968–69 (con-
cluding that it is “hard to know” which of two theories addressing the unconstitutional 
conditions “paradox” is “right”); Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching 
Them to Welfare:  The Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions 
Doctrine, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 971, 971 (1995) (discussing frustration with the “lack of a 
consensus identifying a coherent theoretical framework underlying the [unconstitutional 
conditions] doctrine”); Jonathan Romberg, Is There a Doctrine in the House?  Welfare Reform 
and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 22 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1051, 1053 (1995) 
(“The Court . . . has made no serious attempt to clarify its divergent approach to uncon-
stitutional conditions cases.  Numerous commentators have attempted to do so, but no 
consensus has emerged.”). 
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nored on an unpredictable and seemingly arbitrary basis.82  It identi-
fied two conflicting rules:  (1) the government “is free to attach rea-
sonable and unambiguous conditions to . . . financial assistance that 
[recipients] are not obligated to accept,” and (2) “the government 
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his consti-
tutionally protected . . . [right] even if he has no entitlement to that 
benefit.”83  Either of these principles would decide a case if it were the 
only principle that applied.  The problem is that both principles ap-
ply—or, both might.  The Court has not provided a consistent way to 
determine which principle applies in any given case.84 
Ultimately, Professors William Marshall and Cass Sunstein may be 
right to suggest that there is not, and should not be, a theory of un-
constitutional conditions.85  Marshall writes that “the search for a 
comprehensive theory of unconstitutional conditions is ultimately fu-
tile.”86  He concludes that “whether a governmentally imposed condi-
tion upon the receipt of a benefit is unconstitutional depends upon 
the definition of the particular constitutional protection involved.”87  
Similarly, Sunstein argues that the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine is an “anachronism” that “should be abandoned.”88  Instead, he 
contends, “what is necessary is a highly particular, constitutionally-
centered model of reasons:  an approach that asks whether, under 
the provision at issue, the government has constitutionally sufficient 
justifications for affecting constitutionally protected interests.”89  
Thus, for cases that invoke the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
an analysis should consider the substance of the right at issue and the 
context of the potential violation. 
III.  AN ALTERNATIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT APPROACH 
Because the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has failed to ad-
dress effectively the surrender of constitutional rights across varying 
substantive areas of the law, the Court needs to develop an alternative 
 
 82 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006). 
 83 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 84 See Sullivan, supra note 73, at 1416–17 (providing numerous examples of how “the doc-
trine of unconstitutional conditions is riven with inconsistencies”). 
 85 William P. Marshall, Towards a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions:   The Ex-
ample of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 244 (1989); Cass R. Sunstein, Why 
the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine is an Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, 
Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594–95 (1990). 
 86 Marshall, supra note 85, at 244. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Sunstein, supra note 85, at 594. 
 89 Id. at 595. 
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approach to decide Fourth Amendment violations in the context of 
conditioned welfare benefits.  In comparable situations, the Court 
has moved away from the idea of a generic unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine toward a more substantive analysis.  For example, in 
First Amendment government employee speech rights cases, the 
Court formally developed a context-specific doctrine, known as the 
Connick-Pickering test.90  First Amendment government employee 
speech cases and Fourth Amendment welfare recipient drug testing 
cases share similar features:  both involve an element of consent and 
government non-sovereign (civil), as opposed to sovereign (crimi-
nal), action.  Using the First Amendment cases as an example, the 
Court should develop a special test for Fourth Amendment issues 
pertaining to welfare benefits that considers both the purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment and the government’s needs as a benefit provid-
er. 
A.  A Valuable Example:  The Approach to First Amendment Violations in the 
Context of Government Employee Speech 
Cases addressing government employee speech rights under the 
First Amendment once presented a problem very similar to that of 
welfare drug testing cases.  Under standard First Amendment doc-
trine, the government cannot penalize individuals for the content of 
their speech without meeting strict scrutiny.91  However, speech in the 
context of government employment presents a unique situation.  In-
dividuals are not entitled to government employment, and ordinary 
First Amendment analysis would prevent the government from man-
aging the workplace and disciplining disruptive workers.  Also, the 
government imposes sanctions as an employer in a non-sovereign ca-
pacity (i.e., it fires employees as opposed to arresting them).   
Recognizing these aspects of government employee speech rights 
cases, the Court started using a waiver theory92 and unconstitutional 
conditions analysis.93  Then, it realized that adopting a waiver theory 
 
 90 The test comes from Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) and Connick v. My-
ers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).  For a more detailed discussion, see infra note 95 and ac-
companying text. 
 91 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (“If a statute regu-
lates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 
governmental interest.”). 
 92 See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892) (“[A policeman] 
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”). 
 93 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (“[E]ven though a person has no 
‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny 
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would allow the government to silence public employees seeking to 
speak as citizens.94  And, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, of-
fering an unpredictable choice between that and the alternative, re-
stricting the government’s supervision of its employees, was not a 
good solution.  Hence, the Court abandoned that approach and 
crafted a special First Amendment analysis tailored to address the 
specific features of government employee speech. 
The Connick-Pickering test, derived from two Supreme Court cas-
es,95 considers (1) whether the adverse employment action was moti-
vated by the employee’s speech, (2) whether the speech was about a 
matter of public concern, and (3) a balancing of the employee’s 
speech rights against the employer’s interest in the efficient function-
ing of the office.96  These considerations help ensure that govern-
ment employees have adequate speech protection even though em-
ployment is technically voluntary.97  In other words, the test prevents 
the government from leveraging the employer-employee relationship 
to infringe inappropriately on employees’ rights to free speech.98  It 
provides a context-sensitive analysis taking into account the purposes 
of the First Amendment and the special needs of the government as 
an employer. 
Like public employee speech cases, welfare recipient drug testing 
cases feature consent and non-sovereign government action.  The 
Court has already recognized the significance of these features in the 
Fourth Amendment context.  In addition to identifying consent as an 
important consideration,99 the Court examines the form of govern-
 
him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the gov-
ernment may not rely.  It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his 
constitutionally protected interests . . . .”). 
 94 See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, The Costs of Agencies:  Waters v. Churchhill and the First 
Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233 (1997) (discussing public employ-
ee speech rights). 
 95 See supra note 90. 
 96 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2008). 
 97 Id. at 418–19. 
 98 Id. at 419.  By leveraging, the Court seems to mean the government’s exploitation of a 
pre-existing relationship to acquire power over individuals in an unrelated context.  See 
id. (“The First Amendment limits the ability of a public employer to leverage the em-
ployment relationship to restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees en-
joy in their capacities as private citizents.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think:  
Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 643 (2012) (providing ex-
amples of what may constitute leveraging).  The anti-leveraging principle is presumably 
what the unconstitutional conditions doctrine tries to enforce; it just has not found a co-
herent way to do so. 
 99 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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ment action in the special needs analysis.100  Just as it did in the First 
Amendment context, the Court should formalize an approach to 
Fourth Amendment cases with these characteristics.  For cases chal-
lenging conditions on welfare under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court needs a test that considers both the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Government’s needs as a benefit provider, yet 
prevents the government from leveraging the government-beneficiary 
relationship. 
B.  Proposed Analysis for Fourth Amendment Violations in the Context of 
Conditioned Welfare Benefits 
 For cases challenging conditions on welfare benefits under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court should use a three-prong test that 
considers the search, the consent (or lack thereof), and the govern-
ment’s needs concerning the administration of public assistance.  
The Court should first consider whether the condition constitutes a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  If the condi-
tion does not qualify as a search, the analysis would stop, as there 
would be no Fourth Amendment violation.  If it is a search, the Court 
should consider how harmful it is in terms of the values and purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment.      
   
 Second, the Court should consider how easy it is for the individual 
to withhold consent.  If the government benefit is trivial or nonessen-
tial, then less judicial protection is needed.  However, if the benefit is 
critical to the life and wellbeing of the individual, more judicial pro-
tection is needed.  
 Finally, the Court should consider whether the search is substan-
tially related to the effective administration of the government ser-
 
100 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  Individuals generally receive greater Fourth 
Amendment protection against the government in its non-sovereign capacity.  Compare, 
e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80, 83–84 (2001) (emphasizing the gov-
ernment’s sovereign action, referring to it as a critical distinction, and striking down the 
government policy to give the women full Fourth Amendment protection), with Nat’l 
Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 664, 666 (1989) (noting that the “drug-
testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs of law enforcement” in up-
holding the government’s policy), and Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318, 322–23, 326 
(1971) (upholding the government’s home visit policy, reasoning that the “[t]he visit is 
not one by police or uniformed authority,” that prosecution is not the primary objective 
of the visit, and that “[i]t does not deal with crime or with the actual or suspected perpe-
trators of crime”).  Since providing public assistance is a non-sovereign government ac-
tion, welfare recipients risk receiving inadequate Fourth Amendment protection.  They 
need substantial protection because of both the nature of the violated right and the type 
of benefit at issue.  See discussion infra Part III.C.1–2. 
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vices, or whether the government is, instead, just leveraging power.  
This prong of the test takes into account the government’s need to 
ensure that benefits are properly distributed but also protects indi-
viduals from the inappropriate use of government power.  The gov-
ernment is “leveraging” if it is opportunistically using an individual’s 
dependence on government benefits to obtain power over an unre-
lated area of that individual’s life.  Lack of a clear connection be-
tween the condition imposed and the requirements of program ad-
ministration suggests leveraging because it indicates that the 
government is taking advantage of individuals’ needs to achieve some 
unrelated objective.  Governmental use of sovereign power also sug-
gests that the government is leveraging, because there is no need to 
use law enforcement to implement welfare programs.  If the Court 
determines that the condition is just a means for the government to 
leverage power, it should find a violation of the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
C.  Government Mandated Drug Testing for Welfare Recipients Violates the 
Fourth Amendment 
Under the above test, laws mandating drug testing for welfare re-
cipients violate individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.  Drug tests are 
clearly searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, con-
sent is extremely difficult for welfare recipients to withhold, and the 
tests are not substantially related to the effective administration of the 
benefits.  The government is leveraging power over the poor and 
should not be permitted to do so. 
1.  Drug Tests Are Searches 
The Court has held repeatedly that drug tests constitute searches 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.101  Drug tests are ex-
tremely invasive, much more so than home visits by social workers.102  
They involve collecting bodily fluids, requiring that a sample of blood 
or urine be extracted or excreted from the body.  These fluids con-
tain the most personal of information, DNA.  Thus, these tests not 
only infringe upon a person’s bodily dignity, but also deprive people 
of control over personal, highly sensitive information.  This is exactly 
 
101 See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76 (2001) (holding that urinalysis drug testing constitutes a 
Fourth Amendment “search”) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 
617 (1989)). 
102 Cf. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317–18, 326 (1971) (stressing the “rehabilitative,” “investigative,” 
and “interview nature” of home visits in concluding that such visits were not invasive). 
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the kind of harmful intrusion the Fourth Amendment intends to 
prohibit. 
2.  Consent Is Hard to Withhold 
The stakes of withholding consent are particularly high in the wel-
fare context, signaling the need for more judicial protection.  While 
people subject to drug testing conditions may technically choose not 
to consent, they do so at the expense of meeting their basic daily 
needs, as welfare benefits provide subsistence.  Thus, the costs of 
withholding consent in this situation and losing welfare benefits are 
much higher than the costs of withholding consent in other contexts.  
If a government employee does not consent, she may lose her job and 
have to work elsewhere.  If a student does not consent, she may not 
be able to play on the school soccer team.  But, if a welfare recipient 
does not consent, she may not be able to eat, clothe, or shelter her-
self or her dependents.  Forcing surrender of Fourth Amendment 
rights as a condition of welfare is also particularly troubling since wel-
fare is supposed to promote independence, not reduce dignity.103 
Since welfare is intended to benefit the entire family unit, chil-
dren are unduly affected.  Dependent children are powerless with re-
gard to a parent’s decision to withhold consent.  If a parent, for 
whatever reason, cannot or will not consent to the drug test, innocent 
children do not receive benefits intended to provide for their basic 
needs.104  This potential harm to children also makes withholding 
consent more difficult:  parents willing to go without benefits rather 
than submit to drug tests might reconsider if their children will suffer 
as well. 
 
103 See Gilman, supra note 14, at 1405 (“[A]ccepting welfare can subject one to humiliation, 
but refusing it can result in hunger.  This ‘choice’ hardly promotes autonomy or digni-
ty.”).  As Professor Sullivan points out, this type of condition “discriminates de facto be-
tween those who do and do not depend on a government benefit, [and] it can create an 
undesirable caste hierarchy in the enjoyment of constitutional rights.”  Sullivan, supra 
note 66, at 1490.  She explains, “background inequalities of wealth and resources neces-
sarily determine one’s bargaining position in relation to government, and . . . the poor 
may have nothing to trade but their liberties.”  Id. at 1497–98; see also Roberts, supra note 
76, at 941–43 (arguing that “[a]n individual’s acceptance of government benefits is 
[wrongfully] deemed to constitute a waiver of privacy,” whereas “[w]ealth can help to buy 
the presumption of privacy”). 
104 It should be clear that the state has no interest in punishing children for their parents’ 
misdeeds, much less their parents’ decision to waive a constitutional right.  Cf. Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (holding that children cannot be disfavored based on their 
parents’ immigration status). 
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Moreover, the consent involved in welfare drug testing cases is not 
necessarily informed consent, as required under Ferguson.105  It is of-
ten unclear under state legislation what the government can or will 
do with the information from the drug tests.106  Under TANF, federal 
law authorizes states to sanction individuals who test positive.107  This 
potential exercise of sovereign government power further demon-
strates the need for increased judicial protection from the drug test-
ing policies.108 
3.  The Search Is Not Related to Administering Benefits; Government Is 
Leveraging Power 
The drug tests are not substantially related to the effective admin-
istration of welfare benefits.  Nothing is required of welfare recipi-
ents.  Unlike government employees, welfare recipients are not per-
forming government job functions, nor are they responsible for 
public safety.  The government’s primary concern in distributing wel-
fare benefits is ensuring that the money goes to the correct qualified 
individuals.109  Drug tests do not help it further this purpose.110 
 
105 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84–85 (2001) (“While state hospital employ-
ees . . . may have a duty to provide the police with evidence of criminal conduct that they 
inadvertently acquire in the course of routine treatment, when they undertake to obtain 
such evidence from their patients for the specific purpose of incriminating those patients, 
they have a special obligation to make sure that the patients are fully informed about 
their constitutional rights . . . .”(emphasis omitted)).  Informed consent in the welfare 
context could be achieved through a policy providing an additional monetary incentive 
for welfare recipients who agree to be tested and test negative. 
106 Many of the laws leave open the possibility of criminal sanctions.  See Lebron v. Wilkins, 
820 F. Supp. 2d. 1273, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining that the welfare agency shares 
all positive drug tests with a hotline that is authorized to share its records with criminal 
justice agencies and state attorneys). 
107 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
108 See supra note 100. 
109 Wyman shows that the Government can ensure that welfare funds are going to the proper 
recipients.  Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322 (1971).  Home visits are related to the 
provision of services that affect dependent children, who are objects of public concern.  
See id.  However, unlike a social worker’s observation of a home, drug tests reveal little 
about whether funds have gone to dependent children.  Marchwinski v. Howard warns of 
the danger of accepting this argument:   
If the State is allowed to drug test [welfare] recipients in order to ameliorate child 
abuse and neglect by virtue of its financial assistance on behalf of minor children, 
that excuse could be used for testing the parents of all children who receive Medi-
caid, State Emergency Relief, educational grants or loans, public education or any 
other benefit from the State.  In all cases in which the State offers a benefit on be-
half of minor children, the State could claim that it has a broad interest in the care 
of those children which overcomes the privacy rights of the parents. 
  113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1142 (E.D. Mich. 2000). 
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The government also has an interest in ensuring that the money it 
provides is used for its intended purpose and not to purchase drugs.  
However, the government provides monetary benefits to many citi-
zens without attempting to drug test them.111  For example, the gov-
ernment does not drug test citizens receiving tax benefits.112  Also, 
there is no general principle honored in different contexts that the 
government needs to ensure that taxpayer dollars are not funding 
drug use.  For example, the government does not drug test legisla-
tors, whose salaries are paid by taxpayers.113  There is no reason that 
the government’s interest in not funding drug use is greater in the 
welfare context than in any other context.  Studies have shown that 
the rate of drug use among welfare recipients is lower than that of the 
general population.114  Thus, with policies requiring drug testing for 
 
110 The government cannot argue that drug tests help it ensure funds are distributed to de-
pendent children because tests are conducted before any funds have been distributed.  
See Lebron, 820 F. Supp. 2d. at 1273 (“At the point at which the drug test is demanded, the 
State has not made a TANF contribution for the benefit of the children.”). 
111 See Gilman, supra note 14, at 1391 (“[M]ost government benefits do not flow to the poor, 
yet this is the group we require to sacrifice their dignity and their right to privacy.” (in-
ternal quotation omitted)). 
112 The government gives out billions of dollars of what some have referred to as “corporate 
welfare,” yet it does not drug test CEOs on Wall Street.  Some bloggers have advanced this 
idea.  See Eric Baerren, The Latest Dumb Idea:  Drug Testing People on Welfare, 
MICHIGANLIBERAL.COM (Dec. 30, 2011), http://www.michiganliberal.com/diary/18702/
the-latest-dumb-idea-drug-testing-people-on-welfare (“Perhaps it is time to subject invest-
ment bankers and derivatives traders to routine random drug tests . . . . The health of the 
economy is too important to be left in the hands of potentially drug-addled brains.”). 
113 The reaction to such a suggestion is one of incredulity.  See The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: 
Poor Pee-Ple (Comedy Central television broadcast Feb. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/thu-february-2-2012/poor-pee-ple. 
114 See Associated Press, Florida:  Few Drug Users Among Welfare Applicants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 
2011, at A14 (“Preliminary figures compiled under a new state law requiring drug tests for 
welfare applicants show that they are less likely than other people to use drugs, not 
more.”).  Compare Maia Szalavitz, Does Drug Testing the Poor Do Anything to Reduce Addiction?, 
TIME HEALTH & FAMILY, Aug. 30, 2011, http://healthland.time.com/2011/08/30/does-
drug-testing-the-poor-do-anything-to-reduce-addiction (“One study found that just 4% of 
people receiving welfare were addicted to illegal drugs.”), with Associated Press, supra 
(“The Justice Department estimates that 6 percent of Americans 12 and older use illegal 
drugs.”).  See also Cohen, supra note 7 (“Several studies, including a 1996 report from the 
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, have found that there is no signifi-
cant difference in the rate of illegal-drug use by welfare applicants and other people.  
Another study found that 70% of illegal-drug users between the age of 18 and 49 are em-
ployed full time.”).  In Lebron, the court explained that “researchers found a lower rate of 
drug usage among TANF applicants than among current estimates of the population of 
Florida as a whole.  This would suggest that TANF funds are no more likely to be diverted 
to drug use or used in a manner that would expose children to drugs or fund the ‘drug 
epidemic’ than funds provided to any other recipient of government benefits.”  Lebron v. 
Wilkins, 820 F. Supp. 2d. 1273, 1286 (M.D. Fla. 2011). 
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welfare recipients, the government is leveraging power over the poor 
that it cannot wield over other citizen populations. 
Furthermore, drug testing does not help the government with its 
goal of moving recipients from welfare to work.115  There is no data 
that suggests that drug use among welfare recipients prevents them 
from getting jobs.116  This means that there is no evidence that drug 
testing policies help advance the goal of decreasing dependency on 
public assistance in any way.  On the other hand, the current high 
unemployment rate reflects the struggling economy and the difficulty 
of finding jobs for all citizens.117  Welfare recipient drug testing poli-
cies represent the government’s attempt to cut back in times of eco-
nomic recession by leveraging power over the poor.118  The Fourth 
Amendment was meant to protect individuals from this kind of un-
reasonable government intrusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Emerging legislation mandating drug testing for welfare recipi-
ents stereotypes and criminalizes the poor.  It strips them of their 
dignity and control over their most personal information.  However, 
because there is an element of consent involved with the testing, pol-
icies cannot be analyzed directly under the standard Fourth Amend-
ment special needs doctrine.  Therefore, it is critical for the Court to 
recognize an alternative Fourth Amendment analysis that accounts 
for specific issues pertaining to conditions placed on welfare benefits.  
This can put a stop to unjustifiable coercion that forces individuals to 
choose between sustenance and privacy. 
 
 
115 See 820 F. Supp. 2d. at 1286 (noting the government’s interest in “ensuring that funds are 
not used in a manner that detracts from the goal of getting beneficiaries back to em-
ployment”). 
116 See, e.g., id. (“The researchers . . . found no evidence that TANF recipients who screened 
and tested positive for the use of illicit substances were any less likely to find work than 
those who screened and tested negative.”); see also Cohen, supra note 7 (“Another study 
found that 70% of illegal-drug users between ages 18 and 49 are employed full-time.”). 
117 Unemployment is currently around 8%.  See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Unemployent 
Rate—Seasonally Adjusted, available at http://www.google.com/publicdata/
explore?ds=z1ebjpgk2654c1_&met_y=unemployment_rate&tdim=true&fdim_
y=seasonality:S&dl=en&hl=en&q=current+unemployment+rate (last visited Mar. 6, 2013). 
118 See Gilman, supra note 14 at 1416–17 (“The stigma of drug testing is a way to discourage 
the needy from seeking assistance.  It diverts the attention away from systemic problems 
underlying the modern economy and . . .  allows the government to wash its hands of 
need.”).  Yet, policies have not resulted in any government savings, have “snared few drug 
users,” and have “had no effect on the number of [welfare] applications.”  Lizette Alvarez, 
No Savings Are Found from Welfare Drug Tests, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2012, at A14. 
